On September 9, 2025, the Israeli military issued an across-the-board evacuation order or Gaza City—home to roughly one million people—dropping leaflets that warned of a looming “obliteration” of the area. Despite urging residents to flee to the southern “humanitarian zone” at al-Mawasi, only about 50,000 people relocated, citing prohibitive costs (over US $1,000) and logistical barriers.
AAid agencies and reporters on the ground documented panic, gridlocked roads, and impossible choices for people without money, transport, or safe routes. Humanitarian organizations warned that nowhere is safe and that al-Mawasi is already overcrowded and under-supplied. Visual evidence and contemporaneous reporting anchor the timeline and scale of the order.
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What happened on September 9, 2025?
Shortly after dawn on Sept. 9, 2025, leaflets fluttered over Gaza City. They cited an imminent IDF operation to “clear” remaining Hamas infrastructure and instructed all residents to evacuate immediately toward al-Mawasi in southern Gaza. Throughout the day, wire services photographed families stuffing belongings into cars, handcarts, and on foot, as loudspeaker trucks and radio broadcasts repeated the directive. By evening, reporters described widespread panic and confusion over safe corridors and timing.
The order came amid a broader campaign to target Hamas strongholds in the north and followed a deadly incident near Jerusalem that Israeli officials linked to Hamas, which Israel has vowed to dismantle after the Oct. 7, 2023 attacks. At the same time, major hospitals announced they could not evacuate patients and staff safely, underscoring the medical and ethical bind created by the directive.
Why Gaza City—and why now?
Through mid-2025, Israeli officials increasingly framed Gaza City as the “center of gravity” for residual Hamas command-and-control, weapons caches, and tunnel nodes. In August, diplomats and UN officials were already warning that a planned push to seize or “re-occupy” the city would be a dangerous escalation, foreshadowing September’s evacuation posture. The Sept. 9 order appears as the operational trigger for that phase: telling civilians to move south to reduce friction with expected urban operations.
However, humanitarian actors argued the premise is faulty: even if civilians move, fighting and strikes have continued across Gaza, including the south; al-Mawasi lacks water, sanitation, shelter, and food; and aid access has been inconsistent. The Danish Refugee Council and International Rescue Committee both called the order a mass forced displacement that would “cost lives.”
The mechanics of displacement: routes, money, and “safe passage”
Routes: Residents described trying to reach Salah al-Din Road or coastal tracks while avoiding active shelling. Foot traffic swelled where vehicles could not pass. Families carried children and the elderly over rubble or opted to shelter in place after repeated “no-go” corridor changes or strikes near routes. Photographers captured makeshift convoys and hand-carts stacked with bedding, water jugs, and documents.
Money & transport: A recurring theme in interviews is cost. Taxi and truck rentals reportedly spiked; fuel is scarce; and many households simply cannot afford an evacuation that could involve multiple moves and bribes for passage. Field reports on Sept. 9–10 noted that only a fraction of residents could move promptly. (Newsrooms and aid groups gave varying snapshots; one widely cited estimate was on the order of tens of thousands managing to relocate in the first day.)
“Safe passage” skepticism: Aid organizations and residents questioned whether any route is predictably safe, recalling prior strikes near designated corridors and reports of attacks in al-Mawasi in preceding months. DRC’s Sept. 10 statement calls al-Mawasi a mischaracterized “humanitarian zone,” given conditions on the ground.
Conditions at al-Mawasi: “humanitarian zone” or pressure valve?
Al-Mawasi is a sandy coastal strip that became a de facto encampment over successive IDF advisories in 2024–2025. By early September 2025, UNICEF warned that Gaza City—in the north—was the “last refuge” for many families and that intensifying operations would precipitate an exodus into areas that cannot absorb them. The agency’s Sept. 4 press note anticipated catastrophe if a major push occurred—exactly what unfolded five days later.
On Sept. 9–10, NGOs and reporters described severe overcrowding at al-Mawasi: tents pressed together, open defecation, limited potable water, and rising diarrheal disease. Families who had already been displaced multiple times faced new displacement, often with no shelters left to claim. In places, price gouging on food and water was reported.
Medical, educational, and social impacts
Hospitals: Major facilities in Gaza City reported they could not evacuate. Bedridden patients, dialysis cohorts, NICU wards, and oncology patients cannot be moved safely without fuel, ambulances, and receiving facilities—none of which exist at the scale required. Staff said that turning off equipment to move patients would itself be life-threatening.
Schools and shelters: Many UNRWA school buildings had already become shelters of last resort. The order forced residents to choose between overcrowded southern shelters or remaining in place under intensifying bombardment. Teachers who tried to keep makeshift classes running in shelter courtyards reported suspending lessons as families packed to move.
Social fabric: Displacement fractures neighborhood support systems. Family networks that pooled food/rent split apart; separated children and unaccompanied elders became a focus for aid groups. Community kitchens reported volatile crowding and security incidents around meal distributions as new arrivals surged.
International and diplomatic aftermath (within 24–72 hours)
The evacuation order rapidly intersected with regional diplomacy. On Sept. 9, as Gaza City residents fled, Israel carried out a rare strike in Doha, Qatar, aimed at Hamas political leadership gathered to discuss a U.S.-backed ceasefire proposal. Multiple outlets reported fatalities, though Hamas said top leaders survived. The strike drew global condemnation and immediately complicated mediation, with some signals from Doha of suspended facilitation, later softened in tone.
At the United Nations, leaders warned the situation was spiraling. The prior month, the UN chief had already called Israel’s planned Gaza City push “dangerous.” In parallel, the EU and several member states had criticized the humanitarian toll and mass displacement in Gaza through the summer of 2025, setting the context for September’s outrage.
Legal framing: precaution, proportionality, and feasible alternatives
Under international humanitarian law (IHL), parties must take constant care to spare civilians and civilian objects; precautions include effective warnings and the creation of conditions that actually allow civilians to leave safely. Legal scholars and rights groups point to four friction points in the Sept. 9 order:
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Effectiveness of the warning: Air-dropped leaflets and SMS are standard, but warnings must be practicable—with credible safe routes and adequate time. Reports of strikes near corridors, shifting advisories, and gridlockcast doubt on “effectiveness.”
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Proportionality: Even if fighting targets combatants, foreseeable civilian harm (e.g., mass flight into areas without water/medicine) must not be excessive relative to the anticipated military advantage. Aid groups argue the civilian cost is foreseeably vast.
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Feasible alternatives: IHL expects parties to consider feasible measures to reduce harm (e.g., time-phasedevacuation by district; functional de-confliction for ambulances; guaranteed corridors monitored by neutral parties). Evidence for these measures on Sept. 9 is thin.
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Indiscriminate effects of displacement: Forcing civilians into al-Mawasi, where they may still face strikes and severe deprivation, could shift risk rather than mitigate it. DRC, IRC, and UNICEF explicitly warned of this problem.
Israel, for its part, frames the order as a civilian-protection step prior to urban combat, asserting that Hamas embeds among civilians and uses human shields. The IDF argues that warning allows civilians to distance themselves from targets. The practical dispute—can civilians really move safely and survive where they are sent?—defines the humanitarian critique.
Numbers: how many actually moved?
Early figures varied widely. Visual evidence on Sept. 9–10 shows large outward movement—but not a mass emptyingof the city. Broadly consistent reporting indicates only a fraction of the roughly one million residents moved immediately. Journalists and aid workers repeatedly cite lack of cash/transport, fear of roads, and no space in al-Mawasi as decisive barriers. (Different outlets highlighted “only tens of thousands” moving in the first 24 hours; precise auditing is impossible in real time.)
Imagery and verification
Reuters photo desks and other wire services published date-stamped images from Sept. 9 showing families on the movewith belongings, and leaflets falling over Gaza City. Public-facing humanitarian statements on Sept. 9–10 reinforce the timing and wording of the order, and PBS NewsHour carried field interviews from the same day with displaced families reacting in real time.
Strategic implications
Tactically, the order clears the way for high-tempo urban operations in Gaza City. Strategically, it risks compounding the humanitarian crisis, alienating mediators, and fueling global censure—especially when paired, the same day, with the Doha strike, which placed ceasefire diplomacy in jeopardy. The IDF may achieve short-term operational freedom, but at the cost of international bandwidth and aid access, both necessary for a sustainable endgame.
What to watch next
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Corridor guarantees: Will Israel, Egypt, and mediators formalize monitored routes with time windows and ambulance de-confliction?
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Al-Mawasi surge capacity: Will water, WASH, shelter, and medical inputs scale within days, not weeks? IRC/DRC say current capacity is far short.
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Diplomatic rebound: Can Qatar and other mediators re-knit talks after the Doha strike shook confidence?
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Hospital protections: Are besieged medical facilities afforded localized pauses or de-confliction to avoid catastrophic loss of life?
Sources
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ABC News: “Israeli military issues full evacuation order for all of Gaza City” (Sept. 9, 2025).
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UNICEF: “The unthinkable in Gaza City has already begun” (Sept. 4, 2025).
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Reuters/AP/Guardian: Context on Sept. 9 strike in Doha and diplomatic fallout (Sept. 9–10, 2025).
